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TAX FORUM
BARBARA M. WRIGHT, CPA 
Ernst & Ernst 
Tampa, Florida
This issue of the Tax Forum will discuss 
three recent decisions by the U. S. Court of 
Appeals in the 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits and 
will review their effect on lifetime gifts, Sub­
chapter S elections and gift-leasebacks of pro­
perty between parents and minor children.
Established Lifetime Motive for Gifts
A recent decision by the U. S. Court of Ap­
peals, 5th Circuit (First National Bank at Lub­
bock, Tx. v. U. S., (CA-5) 7/12/72) empha­
sizes the importance of establishing lifetime 
motives for gifts made within three years of 
death. This case points up the fact that even a 
young and healthy donor should generate evi­
dence of life-associated purposes other than 
“love and affection” if he or she hopes to have 
the transferred property escape the application 
of Sec. 2035. This section provides that the 
value of a gross estate shall be all property of 
the decedent, including any that has been trans­
ferred to others in contemplation of his death. 
Sec. 2035(b) states in part: “If the decedent 
within a period of three years ending with the 
date of his death. . . . transferred an interest 
in property .... such transfer .... shall, un­
less shown to the contrary, be deemed to have 
been made in contemplation of death within 
the meaning of this section. . . .” The burden 
of proof rests squarely on the taxpayer and it, 
therefore, behooves any donor of property to 
structure the pattern of giving in such a way 
that a clear lifetime motive is indicated.
In the present case the decedent, Mrs. Vera 
Harrell, age 61 and at the time in apparent 
good health, had consulted her attorney less 
than six months prior to her death regarding 
the preparation of a will. The total value of 
her estate indicated a potential inheritance tax 
of approximately $128,000. Mrs. Harrell ap­
parently expressed some consternation at the 
size of the tax her estate would generate and 
was advised that she could reduce this tax 
liability by gifting some of her property.
Following this consultation Mrs. Harrell 
made four gifts to her daughter totalling in 
excess of $95,450, all within the four-month 
period before her death. Upon review of the 
facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the dis­
trict court’s judgment in favor of the taxpayer
(Estate) and found that the four gifts had 
been made “in contemplation of death.” The 
Court’s reasoning for its decision was clearly 
based on the inability of the taxpayer to pre­
sent specific evidence of life motive. There had 
been no indication that the decedent’s daugh­
ter had either needed the money or intended 
to use it for traveling, a new home, education, 
hobbies, etc., or that Mrs. Harrell’s purpose 
was to avoid income taxes. The Court also 
stated that in so holding it did not intend to 
enable the government to rely on Sec. 2035(b) 
as a virtually irrebuttable presumption.
We may assume from this statement that 
gifts made for purposes other than a reduction 
of estate taxes, even though within three years 
of death, would be recognized as valid ex­
clusions from the donor’s estate. For example, 
gifts that have been made periodically for 
the benefit of incapacitated or indigent bene­
ficiaries would be considered transfers result­
ing from life-associated motivations.
Pseudo—Corporation (Sub S) Status- 
Second Class of Stock
One of the qualifications for electing and 
maintaining Subchapter S status is the require­
ment that a “small business corporation” does 
not have more than one class of stock issued 
and outstanding. In another recent case (Port­
age Plastics Co., Inc. v. U.S. (CA-7) 7/18/72) 
the Court of Appeals, this time the 7th Circuit, 
has reversed a district court decision and found 
that loans from nonstockholders constituted a 
second class of stock.
In the past many Sub S elections have been 
challenged because of “thin” loans by stock­
holders; i.e., a high debt to equity ratio as was 
the case with Portage Plastics. Until this de­
cision by the 7th Circuit Court, the Treasury 
had been rather unsuccessful in reclassifying 
“thin” stockholder loans as a second class of 
stock even when the loans were considered 
equity rather than debt. The tax court and 
several district courts had consistently re­
jected the second class of stock theory both 
under the old Regulations, which attempted to 
classify pro rata “thin” loans as such, and under 
the present amended Regulations, which 
classify only non-pro rata loans as a second 
class of stock. (Reg. 1.1371-1 (g)).
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In the Portage Plastics case, the company 
had borrowed $12,500 from each of two non­
stockholders in exchange for standard note 
forms paying interest in the amount of five 
percent of the corporation’s annual net profit 
before taxes. The agreement was entered into 
on June 1, 1957 (date of corporate organiza­
tion) and the sums were advanced to the 
company between then and December 16, 
1957. In June 1963 the notes were exchanged 
for 245 shares each of the company’s common 
stock. During the intervening years interest 
had been paid as required by the terms of the 
instruments.
The lower court had determined that the 
loans in question were in fact equity in the 
form of contributions to the capital of the 
corporation rather than evidences of debt. 
Again, however, it had rejected the second 
class of stock theory.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the 
equity assumption based upon the following 
facts:
1. There was no provision for repayment of 
the amounts advanced in event of de­
fault on “interest” payments.
2. The “interest” was in relation to and 
paid out of profits.
3. No funds had been provided by Portage 
Plastics for the retirement of the obli­
gations.
4. The notes had been subordinated in 
favor of certain bank loans.
In ruling that there was a second class of 
stock, the Appeals Court found that all of these 
factors tended to support the position that the 
holders of the obligations enjoyed rights or 
interests different from and in preference to the 
holders of the nominal (authorized common) 
stock and, therefore, the equity could be con­
sidered a second class of stock according to the 
provisions of Regulation 1.1371-1(g).
This decision by the 7th Circuit Court may 
encourage an agent when examining a pseudo­
corporation to review all loans made in previ­
ous years. Should the agent find just one non- 
pro rata “thin” loan, even for a brief period, 
that can be labeled “equity,” the Sub S elec­
tion could be nullified from that date forward. 
Destroying the election might have severe tax 
implications for both the corporation and for 
the shareholders who reported the corporate 
income (or loss) on their individual returns 
and paid the tax or received the deduction in 
the year reported.
Gift—Lease hack of Property
In Brooke v U. S. (CA-9 7/26/72) the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit upheld the deci­
sion of the district court in finding that a gift­
leaseback of property between a parent and his 
minor children was a valid transaction, that the 
income from the transferred property was re­
portable by the children, and that as a court- 
appointed guardian the father was equivalent 
to an independent trustee.
Dr. Brooke, a Montana physician, deeded 
real estate including his office, a pharmacy, 
and a rental apartment to his six minor chil­
dren. The Montana Court appointed him as 
guardian and in that capacity he collected 
rents from the property, including rent from 
his own office, and applied the monies received 
to his children’s insurance, health and educa­
tion.
The 9th Circuit found that there was a valid 
gift and leaseback entitling the doctor to de­
duct his rental payments as a business ex­
pense under Sec. 162(a) (3) because: (1) 
the transfer of the property was absolute and 
irrevocable; (2) as donor he retained no con­
trol over the property except as a tenant 
without lease; (3) the trust benefits did not 
inure to the doctor; and (4) as a court-ap­
pointed guardian under Montana law he was 
considered to have the requisite independence. 
The court further found that the taxpayer’s de­
sire to provide for the health and education of 
his children, avoid friction with the other 
partners in his medical practice, and remove 
his assets from threats of malpractice suits 
were non-tax motives well grounded in eco­
nomic reality.
One of the more interesting aspects of this 
case is the determination that Dr. Brooke was 
not legally obligated to furnish his children 
with the items of support for which the rental 
income was used. Sec. 677 (b) of the Code 
provides that income of a trust shall not be 
considered taxable to the grantor unless it is 
used for the support or maintenance of a 
beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obli­
gated to support or maintain. Here, the dis­
trict court had determined that local law ap­
plied. Montana law provides: “The parent 
entitled to custody of a child must give him 
support and education suitable to his circum­
stances.” The court held that private school 
tuition, musical instruments, music lessons and 
a Scout automobile were beyond minimal 
compliance with the requirements of local 
law.
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